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Abstract 
This paper examines the industrial incentives for commercialising advanced materials 
and, in particular, nanomaterials with reference to issues raised in the technology strategy and 
technology entrepreneurship literature.  We draw on longitudinal empirical data to show that 
smaller and newer firms are playing an increasing role in the commercialisation of advanced 
materials innovations.  However, new technology based firms face substantial barriers to 
commercialisation, including access to the complementary assets of large firms and 
institutions.  To illustrate these challenges, we examine a case study of a start-up firm 
commercialising carbon nanotubes.  Through use of an open systems model, we characterize 
their alliances and interactions in attempting to commercialise their products in several markets. 
This analysis illustrates the daunting challenges facing start-up firms as they attempt to 
commercialise advanced materials innovations.  The most difficult challenge appears to be one 
of prioritisation of development objectives and, subsequently, of alliance building. Proposed 
policy recommendations focus on supporting the entrepreneurial process of matching technology 
resources and alliance-building with market opportunities. 
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1 Motivation for Research 
National and international science policy organisations have long recommended fostering 
growth in the areas of information technology, biotechnology, and advanced materials, all 
science based industries predicted to be emerging engines of growth for our evolving knowledge 
based economy.  Advanced materials innovations hold the promise of a unique  impact on the 
economy through their potential to transform a broad range of industries (OECD, 1998; Oliver, 
1999; Maine, 2000).  In this paper, we examine the industry attributes and firm level interactions 
that characterise the commercialisation of advanced materials innovations.  First we provide an 
overview of related prior work.  Next, we describe the unique aspects of the industry 
environment in which advanced materials innovations are commercialised, and present an open 
systems model through which the transactions of advanced materials ventures can be examined. 
Lastly, we examine detailed evidence from a nanomaterials venture and interpret this evidence 
through our model.   
 
2 Prior Work 
There is an extensive literature on technology entrepreneurship (Shane, 2004; Gans & 
Stern, 2003; Garnsey, 1998; Roberts, 1991) technology industry evolution (Garud & Karnoe, 
2003; Utterback, 1994; Pavitt, 1984; Freeman, 1982) technology firm growth (Niosi, 2003; Hugo 
& Garnsey, 2002; Almus & Nerlinger, 1999; Audretsch, 1995), and on technology innovation 
management (Cooper, 2001; Henderson, 1993; Von Hippel, 1988). However, advanced materials 
firms have unique features on the basis of which they merit separate attention.  The limited 
management research to date has focused at the industry level using such measures as overall 
R&D alliances (Hagedoorn, 1991) and production volume growth of new materials (Eager, 
1998; Clark, 1997; Maine, 2000).  Established firms which are producers of industrial materials 
have been studied on the firm level (Niosi and Bas, 2001; Wield and Roy, 1995). Among the 
little evidence available on the early experience of advanced materials ventures is a small 
empirical study on the motivation for technical alliances among Canadian advanced materials 
firms (Niosi , 1993), a longitudinal study of the number of new alliances formed in various 
technology industries (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1991), and a case study on the investment 
attractiveness assessment of a start-up firm commercializing an advanced materials innovation 
(Maine and Ashby, 2002b). We define advanced materials innovations as the commercialisation 
of new functional materials as well as product and process innovations which significantly 
improve the cost-functional frontier of functional materials.   
 
3 Unique Aspects of the Advanced Materials Industry 
Although they share management challenges with ventures in other emerging industries, 
advanced materials firms face a unique combination of management challenges:  high technical 
and high market risk; commercialisation that requires large capital investments, and often a 
period of decades between invention and significant adoption (Maine, 2000; Maine and Ashby, 
2002a).   The commercialisation of advanced materials inventions is so uncertain because 
materials are an intermediate good with broad applications across multiple markets, including 
aerospace, automotive, consumer electronics, construction, energy and communication 
infrastructure, sports equipment, marine applications and biomedical devices.  This results in a 
complex innovation environment, where multiple customer and distribution alliances must be 
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formed, research and development specific to various industry applications must be performed, 
diverse regulatory hurdles must be surmounted, user reluctance to change specifications within 
an established product must be overcome, and process innovation plays a major role (Maine, 
2000; Wield and Roy, 1995).  Additionally, many advanced materials inventions are both radical 
innovations and examples of science-push, as were the laser and personal computers.   Science-
push innovations must feel their way through to substitution for current products and to the 
development of entirely new applications.  This was certainly the case with much of the plastics 
industry, with polyethylene, for example, today producing revenues in excess of $50 Billion, 
taking 20 years to develop applications beyond insulation and radar housing.  Similarly, it took 
DuPont 20 years to profitably exploit Kevlar, a revolutionary polymer fibre that eventually found 
its dominant application in lightweight body armour, after initially targeting automotive tire 
reinforcement and aerospace applications. Yet the potential impact of an advanced materials 
technology breakthrough to the economy is enormous, given the wide reaching nature of their 
applications.  Nanomaterials, in particular, are anticipated to have wide ranging end uses across 
multiple industries (National Science and Technology Council, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Numbers of Advanced Materials Firms in the U.S., by Size Class (1990 – 2000) 
 
Conventional theory and empirical data suggest that the advanced materials industry 
should be dominated by large companies, who have the financial resources and complimentary 
assets to commercialise materials innovations (Pavitt 1984; Freeman, 1982). However, 
entrepreneurial start up firms appear to be playing an increasing role in the advanced materials 
industry as shown by the recent increase in the numbers of U.S. advanced materials firms with 
fewer than 20 employees (Figure 1).  The presence of these very small firms increased by 32% 
in the time period between 1990 and 2000; whereas, the number of large advanced materials 
firms (> 500 employees) increased by 5%.  This trend leads us to focus on the role of start-up 
firms in commercialising advanced materials innovations.  
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4 Commercialising Advanced Materials Innovations: An Open Systems Model 
An open systems approach (Scott, 1987; Checkland, 1981) is appropriate for modeling 
the interactions of a new materials venture as it makes it possible to trace the way successful 
ventures both adapt to and also change their environment, in a form of structuration (Giddens, 
1984).  The most significant interactions we are investigating are those between the 
entrepreneurial firm as a complex open system and other players in their environment: the 
science base, their investors, owners of complementary assets, and potential customers (Figure 
2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interactions of Advanced Materials Ventures with Key Players 
 
 
5 NanoMaterial Venture Case Study Analysed Through Our Model1   
 
5.1 Building a Resource Base at a Carbon Nanomaterials Start-up (CNS) 
CNS is a spin out from prestigious American university. The founder, who is an expert in 
the production of fullerenes2 by combustion synthesis (rather than the costlier carbon arc 
synthesis), started the company in 2001. Currently, CNS has grown to 11 employees and has 
approximately 2 million US dollars of angel investment financing.  The university played an 
active role in creating the management and customer network for CNS. Through official 
                                                 
1
 This case study was developed from interviews conducted by the author with the founder and CEO in Nov., 2003, 
and with information from the company website. 
2
 Fullerenes are a type of  hollow, carbon molecule which includes “buckeyballs” and carbon nanotubes 
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channels, the university provided strong business mentoring services to the technology founder.  
Unofficially, the university was the source of key employees, of word-of-mouth references both 
for the CEO who was recruited and for angel investors, and of the introduction to their vital first 
customer.  
 
5.2 Interactions with Science Base 
As a spin-off, CNS was closely reliant on the university and its resources. The founder 
was a professor there. The company employs his former students, who are highly skilled and 
familiar with the refined combustion synthesis process and related technologies. CNS developed 
its technology at the university and continues to take advantage of the production equipment 
available there. After the formation of CNS, the founder continued to supervise research at the 
university in order to expand the technology base of the company and to achieve an order of 
magnitude of production cost reductions. The patent strength of the company has been assessed 
to be extremely strong.  
The university also provided the connection with CNS’s first licensee. A senior executive of the 
licensee, who initiated interest in the technology, was formerly a professor at the same 
university. 
 
5.3 Interactions with Investors 
CNS is a privately held company. The first round of funding was received through a 
number of angel investors, including the founder and the CFO. The CFO personally knew all of 
the other investors.  The early investment was “a relatively small total amount.”  The founder 
had been given advice that they should keep this initial investment  as small as possible to “build 
the value of the company” and to “reduce the dilution of ownership.”  According to its founder, 
CNS went through a cash-flow crisis in mid 2002 where investors and senior managers disagreed 
about the long-term value of the company and the company was nearly sold for a small amount. 
The founder and his backers convinced investors that “the future could involve very large 
demand for this material” and “this little company could be a very important company in the 
future.” However, thus far, the level of risk and uncertainty has prevented venture capitalists 
from investing in the firm. The founder admitted that they were building the company around “a 
material without an identified market existing now.”  The logic of building the company was 
“the wave of demand coming.”  However, the founder concedes “it is not known how large the 
wave is or when it is coming.” The CEO feels the key to obtaining venture capitalist funding is 
bringing in revenues, which have begun to trickle in this year. 
 
5.4 Interactions with Co-Producers and Distributors 
The main strengths of CNS are its fundamental technology and its senior management. 
CNS requires complementary technologies, marketing and sales and distribution channels to 
access even a small amount of its extremely broad market potential. CNS’s carbon nanotube 
materials can enable applications in “electronics and semiconductors, specialty and conductive 
polymers, antioxidants for pharmaceutical and personal care products, high-efficiency solar cells 
and other organic photovoltaic devices” markets. Not only are these markets too broad for CNS 
to tackle alone, but each individual market has barriers to entry, which CNS cannot overcome 
alone. Hence, CNS has developed relationships with another carbon nanotube producer with 
complementary technology and with a multinational pharmaceutical company. They are 
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currently pursuing partnerships in several of the other market applications. Each market 
application requires customized R&D, such as functionalising fullerenes (adding other chemicals 
to enable properties) for specific applications. Thus, both the expertise and the indication of 
commitment from co-producers are required for CNS to prioritize an application. Additionally, 
the CNS management team has used a licensing business model to enter markets and they plan 
to add their own manufacturing as they grow.  
 
5.5 Interactions with Customers 
CNS has prioritised its technology development to industries where customer interest has 
been expressed. CNS was formed after interest from a Japanese multinational chemical company 
which has since licensed CNS’s technology non-exclusively and has built a 40 metric tonne 
fullerene plant with CNS’s technology. Concurrently, CNS is working with partners and 
potential customers in the personal care market, biomedical market and solar cell coating 
market. The total market potential is very extensive, as are the number of potential partners and 
customers.3 Worldwide demand for nanotubes is expected to reach $600 million by 2010. The 
potential is much higher if the problems of large-scale manufacturing are solved. 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions  
This analysis of CNS illustrates the extent of the challenges facing start-up firms as they attempt 
to commercialise advanced materials innovations.  The most difficult challenge appears to be 
one of prioritization of development objectives and alliance building.  The entrepreneurial firm 
must be continuously matching the firm’s technology and potential for strategic alliances for fit 
with potential market applications, and allocating their resources accordingly (Maine and Ashby, 
2002a). .  Policy to support the emergence of the domestic advanced materials industry should 
focus on supporting this exploratory matching process. With such a broad range of potential 
market applications, no one start-up firm can hope to capture all of the value from their 
advanced materials innovation.  And given the very long gestation times for advanced materials 
innovations, the allocation of the limited time and financial resources of a start-up firm is of 
great strategic importance.  There is a lack of dedicated venture capital funds for new materials 
ventures such as those funds which have emerged in biotechnology, another indication of the 
high levels of uncertainty facing these ventures.  The costs and difficulties of understanding 
emerging markets could be reduced by the provision of government sponsored marketing 
information relevant to advanced materials start-up firms. Some of the uncertainties in 
technological developments could be addressed by providing or subsidising regulatory testing 
(e.g. at university or government laboratories) and by enabling new firms to play a part in 
technology standards-setting processes.  Alliance creation could be facilitated by networking 
events and associations created in sectors with potential for new materials applications. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
3
 Girish Solanki, a Frost & Sullivan analyst who follows nanotech developments, estimates that, for the composite 
materials market alone, more than 150 companies are considering utilizing carbon nanotubes. 
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